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Features European Arrest Warrant – Article 16(2) German Basic Law, which al-
lows exceptionally for the extradition of German nationals, not read in the light of
the European Union integration clause in Article 23(1) Basic Law – Complaint of
violation of the democratic principle put in perspective – Preservation of the state-
hood of Germany – Lack of proportionality in and procedural defects of the
implementing Act
Introduction
There were high hopes regarding the outcome of the judgment of the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht, the German Federal Constitutional Court, of 18 July 2005.1  How-
ever, the decision of the Karlsruhe judges was rather disappointing. It did not
provide any new insights into the future of the European integration ‘entity’, of
which still only one thing is known for sure: it exceeds by far the status of a ‘classic’
international organization, but it has, at the same time, not reached the level of
statehood yet. According to a linguistic invention of the Federal Constitutional
Court, it must therefore live under the term ‘Staatenverbund’ – an indeterminate
designation which implies that it is situated somewhere at a midpoint between a
confederation and a federal state.2
Because the European Union, and in particular the European Community as
its most important unit, progressively discharges functions which not only con-
cern minor aspects of the whole array of public tasks, but also those which are
located close to the pillars of statehood of its member states, time and again ten-
sions arise between these and the Union. It stands to reason that criminal law falls
in the latter category. It is therefore understandable that the Federal Constitu-
* Professor of Public Law, International and European Law, Humboldt University, Berlin.
1 Reprinted in EuGRZ (2005) p. 387.
2 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) 89, 155, at 184, 190. The English
translation provided by 33 International Legal Materials (1994), p. 388 at 423, speaks of an ‘inter-
governmental community’.
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tional Court devoted intense attention to the first case in which it had to assess the
European Arrest Warrant (EAW).
The most prominent characteristic of the EAW, which has its legal foundation
in the Framework Decision of the Council of 13 June 2002 on the European
Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between member states,3  lies in the
duty of states to execute a foreign sovereign act, i.e., an arrest warrant, ‘on the
basis of the principle of mutual recognition’ (Article 1(2)).4  However, this is not a
purely technical operation.5  The execution can – or must – be refused under the
circumstances specified in Articles 3 and 4 of the Framework Decision. Accord-
ingly, even under the new regime, a formal procedure is required in the requested
state to reach a decision on the surrender of the person sought. Nonetheless, the
EAW is a legal instrument that is based upon a high level of confidence in the
reciprocal relationships among the EU member states. Proceedings can be expe-
dited because, to arrest a person with a view to his/her later surrender, no additional
national arrest warrant is required based on data provided by the requesting state.
Other remarkable features of the EAW should be highlighted. An EAW can
also be issued for nationals of a requested state. The requirement of double crimi-
nality has been dropped with regard to 32 categories of offences; in this case, the
offence must be punishable in the requesting state by a custodial sentence or a
detention order for a maximum period of at least three years (Article 2(2) of the
Framework Decision). The requested state has no political discretion.6  The tradi-
tional exception clause of ‘political offence’ has also been abandoned. Notwith-
standing these gains in efficiency, judicial protection should not be curtailed. The
EAW is intended to avoid unnecessary bureaucratic encumbrances, but should
not adversely affect the rule of law, even though one of its objectives is to intensify
the combat on terrorism.
As a legal act, in the sense of Article 34(2)(b) EU, the Framework Decision
lacks direct applicability although, like a directive under Article 249(3) EC, it is
3 Of 18 July 2002, 2002/584/JHA, Official Journal of the European Communities L 190/1.
4 On the drafting process see, in particular, document 15/1718 of the German Bundestag of
15 Oct. 2003; further Nicola Vennemann, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and Its Human Rights
Implications’, 63 ZaöRV (2003), p. 102 at p. 104-108, and Jürgen Jekewitz, ‘The Action of the
European Union to Combat Terrorism’, in: Société Française pour le droit international (ed.), Les
nouvelles menaces contre la paix et la sécurité internationales, Paris 2004, p. 77 at p. 77-82.
5 According to § 78 of the International Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (Gesetz über die
internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, IRG) the general extradition procedure is applicable un-
less the EuHbG has introduced special provisions. Consequently, in view of Art. 104(2) BL, deten-
tion for purposes of surrender must be determined by a judicial decision (§§ 15, 16 IRG). The
concept of a ‘system of free movement of judicial decisions in criminal matters’, as it appears in para.
5 of the preamble of the Framework Decision, is a bureaucratic monster.
6 As far as terminology is concerned, the Framework Decision prefers the two concepts of ‘issu-
ing Member State’ and ‘executing Member State’. In the following, for the sake of convenience, we
shall stick to the traditional terminology: ‘requesting state’ or ‘requested state’.
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binding on the member states as to the result to be achieved. Consequently, it had
to be tranposed into German law. This was done through the European Arrest
Warrant Act (Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz, EuHbG),7  which contains provisions
amending the International Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (Gesetz über die
internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, IRG). The proceedings conducted against
the applicant were founded on those provisions which had formed part of the
IRG since July 2004.
It is common knowledge that initially the extradition of a German national to a
foreign state (‘Ausland’) was forbidden absolutely (Article 16(2), first clause, of
the Basic Law (BL)). The 47th Amendment to the Basic Law, adopted in 2000,8
softened this rigid prohibition. Pursuant to the newly inserted second clause in
Article 16(2) BL
Different rules may be enacted for extradition to a Member State of the European
Union or to an international court, provided that the rule of law (rechtsstaatliche
Grundsätze) is safeguarded.
Thus extradition (or surrender) of a German national to just any third state is not
allowed. Moreover, the fact that a state is a Contracting Party to the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is not considered as a sufficient basis for extradition. In
fact, the judicial systems in several of the 46 states parties to the ECHR give rise to
serious concerns.9  The EuHbG was based on the new clause and was hence de-
signed to establish the conditions for the extradition/surrender of German na-
tionals to European Union member states, all of which can be considered as being
particularly trustworthy. The structural norm of Article 6 EU constitutes the piv-
otal element in this regard. According to the view of the Federal Constitutional
Court, the attempt by the German legislature to regulate the relevant issues failed
because it did not sufficiently take account of the principle of proportionality.
7 Of 21 July 2004, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl.) 2004 I, p. 1748. On this Act see Heiko Ahlbrecht,
‘Freier Personenverkehr innerhalb der Europäischen Union in Auslieferungssachen – die Umsetzung
des Europäischen Haftbefehls in das deutsche Rechtshilferecht’, Strafverteidiger (2005) p. 40-47;
Lyane Sautner, ‘Die Vollstrechung eines Europäischen Haftbefehls nach dem EU-JZG’, Österreichische
Juristen-Zeitung (2005) p. 328-343; Helmut Seitz, ‘Das Europäische Haftbefehlsgesetz’, Neue
Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (2004) p. 546-549.
8 Of 29 November 2000, BGBl. 2000 I, p. 1633.
9 Even with regard to the ‘old’ member states of the Council of Europe, the balance sheet is a
fairly mixed one. In 2005, Italy was subject to 67 ‘convictions’, France to 51 (against 81 for Russia
and 270 for Turkey). Most of these convictions concerned procedural irregularities.
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The Legal nature of Article 16(2) Basic Law
The Federal Constitutional Court chose as its point of departure a perspective
which views the close co-operation of the EU member states within the frame-
work of title VI EU essentially as a loss of substance in terms of the rule of law.
The logic of a proceeding triggered by a constitutional complaint may be prone to
suggest such an approach that, however, is not a necessary consequence thereof.
The Court structured its reasoning pursuant to the model of an ‘abstract review of
norms’ (abstrakte Normenkontrolle) without going into the factual details of the
case at hand and its impact on the applicant. Nowhere did the Court assess whether
the applicant was the actual victim of a specific interference with his fundamental
rights. The violations found derive exclusively from the fact that the IRG, as
amended by the EuHbG, does not correspond to the general requirements of
Article 16(2), second clause, and 19(4) BL – and constitute therefore at the same
time an infringement of Articles 2(1) and 20(3) BL.10
On the whole, the key issue for the Federal Constitutional Court was the deci-
sion enshrined in Article 16(2), first clause, BL, namely freedom from extradition
(which should not be called freedom of extradition). It views Article 16(2), sec-
ond clause, BL exclusively as an exception: ‘This protection, however, can be re-
stricted by law according to the second clause of that provision with regard to
specific instances’.11  This is all the Court was able to say about that guiding propo-
sition. Thereafter the reader finds lengthy explanations about the values underly-
ing the prohibition of extradition and its historical roots12  (yet, some decisive
considerations are overlooked, in particular the arbitrary practice of Soviet courts
vis-à-vis German prisoners of war after World War II).13  Likewise, the ensuing
reflections on the content and scope of the provision14  remain exclusively con-
fined to the negative consequences of Article 16(2), second clause, BL. The provi-
sion is characterized – and rightly so in terms of judicial technique – as establishing
an ‘authorization to interfere’ with the substance of the ban on extradition which,
beforehand, had been guaranteed without any reservation. It is highly significant
that the Court raised the question as to whether the Amending Act of 2000 is
10 Note of the editors: Art. 19(4) gives everyone whose personal rights are violated by a public
authority recourse to a court; Art. 2(1) holds that everyone has the right to freely develop his/her
personality insofar as the rights of others are not violated or the constitutional order or morality are
not offended; Art. 20(3) states that legislation is subject to the constitutional order and that the
executive and the judiciary are bound by law and justice.
11 Section B. I. 1.
12 Section B. I. 1. a). See the criticism of Judge Lübbe-Wolff in her dissenting vote.
13 Some indications thereon emerged during the deliberations of the Parliamentarian Council,
the body which drafted the Basic Law, see 1 Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts, Neue Folge (1951),
p. 169.
14 Section B. I. 1. b).
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unconstitutional on account of a violation of Article 79(3) BL, the ‘eternity clause’
of the Basic Law.15
To be sure, this hypothesis was rejected in a few sentences. However, the reader
will not fail to notice that in a subsequent fairly arid section, which deals with the
insertion of the EAW in the process of integration, the Court confined itself es-
sentially to noting that the member states largely renounced their political discre-
tion in matters of extradition by opting for close co-operation in criminal matters
with a view to establishing an area of freedom, security and justice. It can be
inferred from the following explanatory comments, which underline that co-op-
eration is intended to support the ‘process of integration (Zusammenwachsen) and
the opening of the borders for persons, goods, services, and capital’, that the Court
quite obviously did not do justice to the new political impetus provided by the
Maastricht Treaty more than ten years ago and that it remains stuck in the tradi-
tional economic logic of the EEC Treaty. It is perfectly in consonance with this
approach that thereafter the Court again raised the issue of a possible infringe-
ment of Article 79(3) BL by (exceedingly far-reaching) ‘Entstaatlichung’ (aban-
donment of sovereign powers affecting statehood).16  Article 23(1) BL, which,
inter alia, states that ‘To realize a unified Europe, Germany participates in the
development of the European Union’, is mentioned only as a limit to integration,
when the Court referred to the principle of subsidiarity laid down therein.
A correct interpretation, which would have taken into account the fundamen-
tal decisions on the future development of the German polity in its constitution,
would have led to a different orientation. As we have seen, Article 23(1) BL states
explicitly that the Federal Republic of Germany ‘participates in the development
of the European Union’. In 1992/93, when the European Union was created as
the political framework for the then existing three European Communities, it was
the openly declared objective of all member states to strengthen the links existing
among them beyond a purely economic dimension. The introduction of Union
citizenship, together with the political rights flowing therefrom, provides ample
evidence for those intentions. Likewise, police and judicial co-operation in crimi-
nal matters, which was agreed upon already at that time, was to be an integral
element of the political project which has now been intensified in qualitative terms.
However, the structural link between Article 23(1) BL and Article 16(2), second
clause, BL does not appear anywhere in the reasoning of the Court. Furthermore,
the latter provision, which is not marred by any defect of unconstitutionality and
therefore is a perfectly valid constitutional building block, should have been read
as a constitutional directive on account of its affirmation of European (judicial)
co-operation.
15 Section B. I. b) aa).
16 Section B. I. 1. b) cc).
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Instead, the Court treated the two clauses of Article 16(2) BL as being of un-
equal weight. It perceived the second clause rather as an anomaly, as a mere limi-
tation, while for it the value substance is embodied exclusively in Article 16(2),
first clause, BL. However, the second clause is significantly different from the
majority of the other limitation clauses in the Basic Law. Those other clauses
generally do no more than authorize in general terms restrictions of fundamental
rights, whereas Article 16(2), second clause, BL proclaims to be an instrument for
the realization of the objectives stated in Article 23(1) BL. Consequently, the
judicial assessment followed a line of which the primary signposts are constituted
by the statehood of Germany and its system of judicial protection, instead of
reflecting on the opening which the German constitutional system experienced in
1993 through the introduction of Article 23(1) BL.
It stands to reason that we do not wish to engage here in naive Euro-euphoria.
Not everything that bears the label ‘European’ is good for that sole reason.17  But
it matters decisively whether a fundamental right is restricted on grounds flowing
from current day-to-day policies or whether long-term, structural aims are being
pursued which have been approved by constitutional amendment. In this regard,
the judgment suffers from a gap in its reasoning, leaving the reader unsatisfied.
The substantive criticism of the EuHbG
Duty to observe factual developments
There is no doubt that to authorize extradition/surrender to a foreign judicial
authority amounts to interference in a fundamental right. The parliamentary bodies,
acting as constitutional legislature, clearly acknowledged their preoccupation with
the rights of the persons concerned by providing that extradition is permissible
only if ‘principles of the rule of law are complied with’. According to the general
rules shaped by the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court over decades, the
principle of proportionality is one of the main parameters that must be respected.18
Consequently, the ensuing considerations of the Court deserve full support. Yet
the Court made a slightly misleading comment when it contended that the legis-
lative bodies themselves have to examine whether the relevant ‘requirements un-
der the rule of law are fulfilled by the requesting authorities’.19  As rightly pointed
out by Judge Lübbe-Wolff in her dissenting opinion,20  the task of monitoring
17 However, the criticism by Bernd Schünemann, ‘Europäischer Haftbefehl und EU-
Verfassungsentwurf auf schiefer Ebene’, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (2003) p. 185-189, seems to be
largely overstated.
18 See ultimately BVerfGE 110, 1, at 28 et seq.; 141, at 163 et seq.; 177, at 193 et seq.; 226, at
262 et seq.; BVerfGE 109, 96, at 111 et seq.
19 Section I. 1. c) aa).
20 Section 4.
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whether these requirements are fulfilled in individual cases cannot be incumbent
upon the legislature, both on factual and institutional grounds. One may hope-
fully assume that the Court did not suggest that a system has to be established
similar to that provided for in Article 16a(2) and (3) BL.21  It is true, on the other
hand, that blind faith in the rule of law in the other member states of the EU also
is not the right solution. If a considerable deterioration of the essential procedural
guarantees should occur in another country, § 73 IRG would become applicable
in any event.22  According to this provision, judicial assistance is prohibited if it
should ‘contradict essential principles of the German legal order’. This precept is
in perfect harmony with the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court. An
extradition jeopardizing indispensable constitutional principles to the detriment
of the person concerned would in any event be unlawful, not only under German
law,23  but also under Article 6 EU, the key principle of the entire EU legal order.
Furthermore, as the Court rightly pointed out, in such a situation the legislature
should enact by statute general measures of protection, irrespective of whether a
proceeding under Article 7 EU has been set in motion.24
The applicant had raised two principled complaints against the relevant provi-
sions of the IRG as amended by the EuHbG. On the one hand, he invoked a
violation of the democratic principle inasmuch as the European Parliament (EP),
in accordance with Article 39 EU, had only been consulted on the Framework
Decision. On the other hand, the applicant contended that the EAW was a mea-
sure exceeding the scope of Article 23(1) BL, and thereby contributed to an
‘Entstaatlichung’ of Germany. The Court rejected both complaints.
Democratic deficit
The Federal Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint of a violation of the
democratic principle fairly summarily. It observed that, within the third pillar, the
legislative bodies of the member states ‘retain the political power of determination
within the process of implementation, if necessary by refusing implementation’.25
The concerns raised certainly could have been dealt with in a more appropriate
21 Note of the editors: the first section of Art. 16 a proclaims the right of asylum for persons
persecuted on political grounds, the second section makes an exception for persons coming from
member states of the European Union or from other states in which the application of the Geneva
Convention on refugees or the European Convention on Human Rights is ensured. These latter
countries must be determined by an act of parliament which needs the consent of the second cham-
ber, the Bundesrat. Art. 16 a(3) adds that such an act can also declare other countries ‘safe’ if it seems
to be guaranteed that neither persecution on political grounds nor inhuman or derogatory punish-
ment and treatment takes place.
22 See also § 49 (1) No. 2 IRG.
23 BVerfGE 75, 1, at 19.
24 Section B. I. 1. c) aa).
25 Section B. I. 1. c) bb).
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way. Applying general principles of international and constitutional law to the
third pillar, one may find it indeed truly exceptional that an agreement becomes
binding before being approved by the competent parliamentary bodies. Accord-
ing to the model reflected in Article 59(2) BL, which is common to most states in
Europe, important international agreements require parliamentary consent be-
fore the organ entrusted with the power of external representation may proceed to
ratification (or other forms of acceptance) under international law. There can be
no doubt that a decision on a simplified regime of extradition/surrender consti-
tutes an important question since, on account of it, a fundamental right – protec-
tion against extradition – suffers a significant restriction. Through the system
introduced by the EAW, the citizen is subject to the criminal jurisdiction of for-
eign states. Additionally, with regard to 32 groups of offences, the individual is
deprived of the traditional guarantee that an offence must be punishable in both
states, i.e., also in one’s own country, before extradition can be granted.
It is obvious that through the adoption of the Framework Decision the parlia-
ments of the member states were presented with a fait accompli, in any event
regarding the essential elements of the EAW, since they were only authorized to
determine the modalities of implementation in accordance with respective na-
tional legal systems. To admonish them to refuse, if necessary, the requisite ‘Union
loyalty’ provides no answer to the problem, as is convincingly demonstrated by
Judge Lübbe-Wolff.26  In the present configuration, however, it can be argued
without any major difficulty that the national legislatures gave their consent to
the Framework Decision in advance. In the present context, the EU Treaty iden-
tifies the specific task to be fulfilled. The specified program of action in Article
31(2)(b) EU corresponds precisely to the requirements of legal certainty regard-
ing transfers of competences defined by the Federal Constitutional Court in its
Maastricht judgment.27  Article 32(2)(b) states that, within the framework of judi-
cial co-operation in criminal matters, the member states agree to strive for the
facilitating of extradition among them. This is a formulation that would even
satisfy the requirements of Article 80(1) BL regarding the stipulation of provi-
sions authorizing the enactment of (delegated) regulations. Had this provision
been laid down in the EC Treaty, no one would have doubted that it corresponds
to the principle of limited powers (compétences d’attribution). As long as the defin-
ing act of democratic legitimation is viewed in the approval of the treaties by the
national parliaments, and as long as the exercise of public powers by organs made
up of persons only indirectly legitimated in democratic terms is accepted, it does
not matter whether a genuine transfer of sovereign powers has taken place which
leaves no room whatsoever for national authorities, or whether a power of inter-
26 Section 5 of her dissenting opinion.
27 BVerfGE 89, 155, at 189 et seq.
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governmental action is established under which the national legislative organs can
still discharge – modest – functions of transposition and execution. On the con-
trary, in this latter case the interference in the democratic substance does not have
the same degree of intensity.
On the other hand, specifically in the international field one should not over-
rate the decision-making power enjoyed by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. It is
certainly true that treaties of the kind specified in Article 59(2) BL require parlia-
mentary approval before the formal act of acceptance under international law
may be effected. But one should soberly take note of the fact that because of the
complexity of the processes of negotiation in the relevant international fora, things
boil down to the following proposition: les jeux sont faits once the texts have been
drawn up. Parliaments are confined to an ‘ex post assessment’.28  Consequently,
they should influence the relevant negotiating processes and make their views
known in due time. Only then are they capable of co-shaping international legis-
lative projects. As its premise, this has accurate information, structured according
to the importance of the individual projects, which according to the law on the
books seems to be secured by the Act on the Co-operation between the Federal
Government and the German Bundestag in Matters of the European Union,29
and the Act on the Co-operation between the Federation and the Länder in Mat-
ters of the European Union.30  Through the channels of information institution-
alised by these laws, the parliamentarian bodies can exert influence, regardless of
whether the draft measures are located in the field of Community law or in the
‘third pillar’.
However, it seems obvious that in this case the national parliaments in all the
then existing 15 member states failed to live up to legitimate expectations. Only
in this way can it be explained that a number of vague and indeterminate offences
such as computer-related crimes, racism and xenophobia as well as sabotage were
included in the Framework Decision as offences for which the requirement of
double criminality is lifted.31  As far as can be seen, none of the thousands of
28 Christian Tomuschat, ‘Der Verfassungsstaat im Geflecht der internationalen Beziehungen’,
36 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (1978), p. 7 at p. 31.
29 Of 12 March 1993, BGBl. 1993 I, p. 311.
30 Of 12 March 1993, BGBl. 1993 I, p. 313.
31 In legal doctrine many voices have criticized the inclusion of these three classes of criminal
conduct in the list of offences for which the requirement of double criminality is abolished; see
Ahlbrecht, supra n. 7, who speaks of ‘despise’ of a ‘liberal criminal policy which had grown in
Europe over centuries’; Ewa M. Guzik Makaruk, ‘“Ne bis in idem”. Europäischer Haftbefehl und
der Verfassungsentwurf für Europa aus polnischer Sicht’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswis-
senschaft (ZStW) 116 (2004), p. 372 at p. 374; Gustavo Pansini, ‘La réception du mandat d’arrêt
européen en Italie. Brèves réflexions’, in: Marie-Elisabeth Cartier (ed.), Le mandat d’arrêt européen
(Bruxelles 2005) p. 179 at p. 181; Schünemann (footnote 16), p. 188. Criticism has also been
voiced because of the lack of precision of the list in Art. 2(2) of the Framework Decision, see Michel
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parliamentarians in Europe, who were all informed in some way or another, pro-
tested against that list of horrors nor called upon his or her government to deny
consent. The ministers of justice are to be blamed as well since they simply let
their staff act – without being aware of the delicate nature of those offences, which
permit the most diverse interpretations and which can hardly be traced back to a
common European stock of values. In the inundating floods of European activi-
ties, what seems to be lost is a compass for identifying the essential threats to the
freedom of the citizen.
The above considerations, which emphasize the preciseness of the normative
program laid down in Article 31(1)(b) EU, do not resolve the problem of demo-
cratic legitimacy. The Maastricht judgment, however, already concluded that pro-
visionally, as long as the ‘Staatenverbund’ exists, compromises must be accepted.32
On the one hand, a democratic deficit is being complained of but, on the other, as
soon as the powers of the European Parliament are decisively enlarged and deep-
ened, invariably the objection of ‘Entstaatlichung’ arises. The Federal Constitu-
tional Court takes this objection very seriously, using it as a legitimate concept of
legal argumentation. Precisely for that reason, it will be necessary to get acquainted
with the idea of living in certain provisional settings for a long time to come – il
n’y a que le provisoire qui dure – which exactly corresponds with the factual state of
development of the European Union. National sovereignty and Community
(Union) power must be brought into a delicate balance. One should acknowledge
that this system of different levels of governance by its very nature cannot have the
consistency and straightforwardness of national constitutional systems. The dan-
gers lie less in a denial of democratic decision-making power to the detriment of
the demos, but rather in a lack of transparency which leads to a blurring of ac-
countability. Moreover, many national parliaments do not seem to have noticed
how influential they can be and the responsibility they have to shoulder in shap-
ing the political processes in Europe through the different mechanisms which
permit them to bring pressure on their governments.33
‘Entstaatlichung’
The Federal Constitutional Council devoted considerable attention to the com-
plaint of ‘Entstaatlichung’.34  As already mentioned, this complaint eventually did
Massé, ‘La decision-cadre’, in: Le mandat d’arrêt européen, p. 47 at p. 59; Cristina Mauro,’Réflexions
à propos de la loi introduisant le mandat d’arrêt européen en France’, ibid., p. 201 at p. 210 (‘catégories
assez floues’).
32 BVerfGE 89, 155, at 186 et seq.
33 From the very beginning, the Danish Parliament, the Folketing, has been a laudable – and
sometimes disturbing – exception.
34 Section B. I. 1. b) cc).
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not find a positive echo with the judges although it was accepted as topos arguendi.
In the relevant section, the Court drew firm boundary lines, essentially in accor-
dance with the Maastricht judgment.35  The state has to remain entrusted with
tasks of ‘substantial weight’; essential public tasks cannot be abandoned. It is hardly
understandable, however, why in this connection, with an almost threatening tone,
the judges rejected a ‘general harmonization of the criminal legal systems of the
Member States’. Why is it not legitimate, within a ‘Staatenverbund’, which con-
ceives of itself as a polity with commonly shared values, to pursue the harmoniza-
tion of criminal law designed precisely to uphold those common values?36  Looking
at the list of offences set out in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision, one comes
indeed to the conclusion that broad agreement exists about many breaches of the
law that deserve to be punished. Whether those breaches are sanctioned by way of
‘limited mutual recognition’, namely through mutual judicial assistance on the
basis of the EAW, or by way of ‘general harmonization of the criminal systems of
the Member States’ should make no difference with regard to German constitu-
tional law.37  Yet at the same time, as already mentioned, the list of Article 2(2) of
the Framework Decision was extended in an almost ‘criminal’ way, a monumental
failure of the responsible German constitutional organs, which can hardly be at-
tributed to the relevant legal basis of the Framework Decision.38
On the whole, section B. I. 1. b) cc) of the judgment clearly shows to what
high degree subjective considerations can colour the judgments on the preserva-
tion of the ‘statehood’ of Germany. On many points the reader is reminded of the
German debate on whether the progressive transfer of tasks and powers from the
Länder to the Federation has undermined, in a slow process of erosion, the
‘federality’ of the system. Undeniably, the process of European integration has
protruded close to the core elements of statehood. But it remains that the institu-
tions of the Union are vested only with limited competences and that, to this very
date, the European Parliament has been denied comprehensive legislative powers.
Thus, the Union has to operate within a legal framework which exhaustively de-
35 BVerfGE 89, 155, at 186.
36 See in this connection Sabine Gleß, ‘Zum Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung’, 116 ZStW
(2004), p. 353 at p. 361, who convincingly demonstrates that the guarantees afforded to the indi-
vidual are strengthened precisely through harmonization of criminal law; her views are shared by
Isabelle Jégouzo, ‘Le mandate d’arrêt européen, acte de naissance de l’Europe judiciaire pénale’, in:
Le mandat d’arrêt européen (Cartier, supra n. 31), p. 33 at p. 39; Gonzalo Quintero Olivares, ‘Le
mandat d’arrêt européen dans la perspective européenne d’unification de la justice pénale et la
réglementation espagnole, ibid., p. 163 at p. 164-172.
37 This is also recognized by Bernd Schünemann, ‘Fortschritte und Fehltritte in der Strafrechts-
pflege der EU’, 151 Goltdammer’s Archiv (2004), p. 193 at p. 197 et seq.
38 Schünemann’s contention (supra n. 37, at p. 207) that the Framework Decision went beyond
its scope ratione materiae and lacked therefore any binding force, will not be discussed here. In any
event, the FCC did not express any doubts as to the validity of that act.
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fines its powers ratione materiae. It does not enjoy Kompetenz-Kompetenz. It is not
capable of unilaterally extending the space of action allotted to it. Lastly, the member
states still have the final word, a fact which is reflected tellingly in the power of
withdrawal formally recognized in the draft European Constitutional Treaty (Ar-
ticle I-60).39  Against the declared will of all of its member states, the Union has
no claim to statehood. Accordingly no ‘Entstaatlichung’ can have taken place to
the detriment of Germany – and of course to the other member states.
Proportionality
Regarding the central issue of proportionality, one can easily follow the distinc-
tion made by the Federal Constitutional Court between offences with a defining
link of domestic territoriality and offences with a defining link to a foreign coun-
try.40  Invariably, criminal prosecution abroad constitutes a sacrifice for a German
national. However, if he or she goes to a foreign country and commits an offence
there, it simply corresponds to elementary logic and is in line with international
law, according to which in criminal matters the principle of territoriality still domi-
nates, to conduct the proceedings where the victims have their residence and where
witnesses and other evidence are easily accessible.41  It is a different matter alto-
gether if the offence was perpetrated in Germany. One can hardly argue against
the holding of the Court that in such instances judicial prosecution should take
place, in principle, before German tribunals. It is striking, though, that the judg-
ment lacks any detailed considerations elaborating on this fundamental distinc-
tion in respect to the case at hand. The facts as set out in the introductory part of
the judgment mention ‘visits of the applicant to Spain as well as meetings and
telephone conversations with alleged perpetrators’, i.e., acts in Spain, which in
fact led the Audiencia Nacional in Madrid to issue the arrest warrant. According to
the arrest warrant of the Hanseatic Court of Appeals of Hamburg of 15 October
2004 the applicant acted presumably ‘in Spain, Germany and the United King-
dom’ as ‘the key figure of the terrorist network Al Qaeda’. This does not support
the inference that a predominant link to Germany was present. Concerning mixed
configurations, i.e., facts linked to both Germany and (an)other state(s), the Con-
stitutional Court requires an actual balancing test in every individual case.42  But
in casu, it does not follow its own criteria, notwithstanding the fact that in the
context of a constitutional complaint attention must be focused primarily on the
case at hand. Here again it emerges that the focus of the Federal Constitutional
39 Official Journal of the European Union, C 310/1, 16 Dec. 2004.
40 Section B. I. 1. c) cc).
41 See also Cornelius Nestler, ‘Europäisches Strafprozessrecht’, 116 ZStW (2004), p. 336 at
p. 338 et seq.
42 Section B. I. 1. c) cc).
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Court was less on remedying the alleged violation of a fundamental right and
more on making use of the case to carry out a comprehensive review of the rel-
evant provisions of the IRG in the vein of a proceeding for the ‘abstract control of
norms’.
Eventually, after examining the compatibility of the EuHbG with the constitu-
tional principle of proportionality, the Court concluded that the legislative bodies
failed to avail themselves of the discretionary powers enjoyed by them for the
protection of German nationals. Regarding cases having a domestic territorial
link, Article 4(7)(a) of the Framework Decision is particularly pertinent. Accord-
ing to that provision, the execution of an arrest warrant may be refused if the
offence was committed in whole or in part in the territory of the requested state.
The same applies if domestically criminal prosecution has been initiated against a
suspect (Article 4(2) of the Framework Decision), or if the judicial authorities of
the requested state have decided not to commence a criminal proceeding on ac-
count of the offence underlying the arrest warrant, or to halt pending proceedings
(Article 4(3) of the Framework Decision). No use whatsoever had been made of
Article 4(7)(a) in the EuHbG, and the two other clauses were taken into account
only to a limited extent. In the relevant German provision, § 9 No. 1 IRG, which
deals with a number of obstacles to extradition under the title ‘concurring juris-
diction’, the halting of criminal investigations – an act on which the person con-
cerned should in principle be able to rely – does not appear at all. Lastly, §§ 83b
No. 1 and 2 IRG, regarding the initiation of domestic proceedings and the deci-
sion not to commence proceedings of criminal prosecution, have been set forth
only as discretionary powers. These are the specific deficits that prompted the
Court to declare the EuHbG void.
In respect to Article 4(2) and (3) of the Framework Decision, it is somewhat
difficult to understand whether there really was a failure to make use of the discre-
tion granted by the European act. Apparently the Court holds that the grounds
enunciated in those two provisions should have been established as compulsory
obstacles to surrender and should not have remained purely discretionary powers
(Kannbestimmungen). But the Court did not elaborate on this issue in any de-
tail.43  Since proportionality is a constitutional principle binding on the executive
and the judicial branches of government, it would have been preferable to rely on
the consciousness of the competent authorities, by stressing that in case of termi-
nation of a prosecutorial investigation surrender should be refused as a rule. In
that regard, the opinion of dissenting Judge Gerhardt is more persuasive than the
decision of the Court.
43 Section B. I. 1. d) bb).
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Regarding non-resort to the clause of Article 4(7)(a) of the Framework Deci-
sion, the gap in the IRG appears to be more serious at first glance than it is in
reality. With respect to the majority of the offences listed in Article 2 of the Frame-
work Decision, it appears almost inconceivable, given the principle of legality as it
applies in Germany,44  not to witness at least the initiation of an investigation if a
domestic connection is present. Otherwise, the competent prosecutorial authori-
ties could be blamed for grossly failing to comply with their duties. If an investi-
gation is commenced, § 83b Nos. 1 and 2 IRG were to become applicable. Even
after an arrest warrant has been received from another European country, an addi-
tional German investigation may be initiated.45  The danger for a German to be
surrendered on account of a crime committed in Germany appears, therefore, to
be rather theoretical. At the most, some borderline cases may occur. Yet the case at
hand provides no evidence for such a configuration, as was already pointed out.
Lastly, the question must be asked whether the reasons invoked by the Federal
Constitutional Court, in particular the failure to transpose Article 4(7)(a) of the
Framework Decision into the IRG, made it really imperative to come to a finding
of unconstitutionality. Could the defect have been healed by way of an interpreta-
tion in conformity with European law? There should be no doubt that, in the
same way a national statute enacted to transpose a Community directive must be
interpreted in the light of that directive,46  national measures implementing a
framework decision should be placed under the same methodological require-
ment. The ECJ embraced that approach recently in the Pupino case,47  and its
holding corresponds fully to the doctrine of interpretation in conformity with
international law as evolved by the Federal Court in its own case-law. Judge Gerhardt
based his dissenting opinion,48  inter alia, on the Pupino judgment which was
handed down shortly before the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court,
but to which, amazingly, the majority does not refer at all. To declare the entire
law (EuHbG) unconstitutional has only a certain plausibility from the viewpoint
of the Federal Constitutional Court. It believes that it found a gap in the system
of judicial protection that threatens the freedom of the citizen. Regarding such a
fundamental issue, it considered absolute legal clarity to be necessary, which can-
44 According to this principle, the prosecutorial authorities are generally obligated to prosecute
ex officio any criminal conduct (§ 152(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
45 See Ahlbrecht, supra n. 7, at p. 46, who even maintains that in such circumstances it is
urgently required to initiate a criminal proceeding under German criminal law.
46 Court of Justice of the European Communities, case C-106/89, ECR 1990, I-4135, para. 8
– Marleasing; case C-334/92, ECR 1993, I-6911, para. 20 – Wagner, Miret; case C-91/92, ECR
1994, I-3325, para. 26 – Faccini Dori; see also Paul Craig/Graínne de Búrca, EU Law (Oxford
2003) p. 211 et seq.
47 Judgment of 16 June 2005, case C-105/03.
48 Section I. 1.
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not be obtained through references to the Framework Decision and the constitu-
tional principle of proportionality. This line of reasoning is understandable, but
finally does not convince inasmuch as domestically committed offences that could
lead to surrender on the basis of an EAW constitute more a theoretical construct
than a class of cases realistically conceivable. Consequently, it would have been
preferable, as suggested by Judge Gerhardt,49  not to strike down the EuHbG in
its entirety but to deny its applicability in certain classes of cases. The damage
caused by the Court’s decision is indeed considerable. Only a few days after the
delivery of the judgment, newspapers reported that surrender procedures between
Germany and Spain had ground to a halt.50  It will take a considerable time to
carry out the requisite repair work.
Procedural defects of the EuHbG
The Federal Constitutional Court found another constitutional infringement,
which is of a procedural character. It held that, contrary to § 74b IRG, a remedy
must be available against a decision granting surrender, a conclusion entailed by
the fact that such a decision falls within the scope of Article 16(2) BL and does
not concern political considerations outside individual entitlements only.51  That
view is sustained by ample reasoning and can hardly be called into question, and
yet it has shaky foundations as will be shown in the following.
The legislative authorities have failed to recognize that by laying down precise
criteria for the refusal to comply with a request for surrender, the Framework
Decision has fundamentally altered the pre-existing system. The legal situation
becomes even more complex due to the fact that the surrender of every alien, and
not only of a ‘domestic alien’ in the sense contemplated by § 80(3) IRG,52  has
aspects relevant in terms of fundamental rights. Any arrest, because it implies
deprivation of liberty, interferes with the fundamental right under Article 2(2)
BL; in any event Article 2(1) BL would apply.53  Following the premises of the
Federal Constitutional Court, the legislature cannot confine itself to introducing
new rules for German nationals; rather, the entire system has to be re-assessed. If
in the future in surrender proceedings, two decisions were rendered, first a deci-
sion on admissibility and thereafter the authorization to extradite proper, both of
which are subject to judicial challenge, fairly complex procedural configurations
49 Section II.
50 Die Welt, 23 July 2005.
51 Section B. I. 2.
52 Essentially, a ‘domestice alien’ is an alien enjoying a stable right of sojourn in Germany.
53 Note of the editors: Art. 2(2) holds that freedom of the person is inviolable and may only be
restricted pursuant to a statute, Art. 2(1) that everyone has the right to freely develop his/her per-
sonality.
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54 Bundestag document 15/1718, supra n. 4, at p. 10.
55 In Austria, that interpretation was not embraced, see Sautner, supra n. 7, at p. 329, 332.
56 The Spanish text speaks of ‘autoridad judicial’, and the Dutch text uses the concept ‘rechterlijke
autoriteit’.
57 Mauro, supra n. 31, at p. 216 et seq., raises objections against certain modalities of the French
statute of implementation.
could result therefrom. Following the reasoning of the Court, it is obvious that
far-reaching overlaps will occur inasmuch as in either proceeding the legal posi-
tion of the person concerned has to be taken into account. Just a short glance at
§ 83 IRG on the one hand and § 83b IRG on the other shows the proximity between
a decision on admissibility and the subsequent authorization to surrender.
Therefore the decision to maintain the double-track system under the regime
of the EAW was a mistake. It seems that the German statute implementing the
Framework Decision needs to be modified much more fundamentally than is
suggested by the Court. To introduce two parallel and overlapping judicial proce-
dures cannot be an ideal solution. In principle, the regime of the EAW is designed
to concentrate the decision on a request for surrender in the hands of one single
authority, namely a judicial body (see, in particular, Articles 6(2) and 15 of the
Framework Decision). It therefore seems advisable to submit all determinations
touching upon the fundamental rights of the persons concerned to judicial re-
view, with a subsequent act of authorization to surrender exclusively dedicated to
general questions of political expediency – at least if such questions still exist in an
environment permeated by fundamental rights, and if the Framework Decision
allows for such a double-track procedure. In that regard, considerable doubts ex-
ist.
One has to assume that Germany fell prey to a serious error relating to the
concept of ‘judicial authority’ when it drafted the EuHbG. As precisely shown by
the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court, with its preliminary
stages in Hamburg, the opinion prevailed that a Ministry of Justice is a judicial
authority as contemplated by the Framework Decision. The explanatory report to
the bill says in simple terms that it was left to the member states to determine the
competent national authorities.54  That statement is correct, but at the same time
erroneous insofar as, with its unclear reference to the federal power for external
relations under Article 32(1) BL, it seeks to maintain the pre-existing competence
of the Federal Government.55  The English text of the Framework Decision speaks
clearly of a judicial authority, i.e., an authority made up of judges, and likewise
the French text, using the words ‘autorité judiciaire’, makes clear that an executive
authority is not included.56  This result of a literal interpretation is confirmed by
the teleology of surrender under the regime of the EAW. Political discretion is to
be eliminated; the relevant decisions shall be made exclusively by judges.57  In this
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58 The statement in the explanatory report, Bundestag document 15/1718, supra n. 4, at p. 11,
to the effect that the existing German system requires no systemic overhaul, would therefore appear
to be less than well-reflected. Ahlbrecht, supra n. 7, at p. 42, reports that the German decision to
maintain the existing system created considerable uneasiness in the EU and in some member states.
Doubts were also voiced by Seitz, supra n. 7, at p. 547. Massé, supra n. 31, at p. 47, 54, states
unequivocally that the EAW leads to a ‘mise hors circuit des ambassades et des gouvernements’ and
that the procedure is now ‘purement judiciaire’. The problem is not recognized by Jörg Schwalm,
‘Le mandate d’arrêt en Allemagne’, ibid, p. 101 at p. 108.
59 See Vennemann, supra n. 4, at p. 114-120.
60 A hardly convincing attempt to justify the decision was undertaken in the explanatory report
to the bill, Bundestag document 15/1718, supra n. 4, at p. 17.
regard, a profound re-examination of the German law of implementation is nec-
essary, a re-examination that cannot remain confined to the directives imparted
by the Federal Court.58  The existing German regime is predicated on the miscon-
ception that the decision on admissibility, which lies in the hands of a Court of
Appeals, constitutes no more than the first step in the process of surrender where
the executive branch has the final word. The Court, too, proceeds from this con-
cept, which is not in harmony with the general provisions of the Framework De-
cision.
Concluding observations
In the future, problems relating to the EAW will probably arise less on the grounds
dealt with by the Federal Constitutional Court, but rather from fear of disrespect
of the rule of law in one of the member states and from the threat of covert
political persecution. Although in principle sufficient legal safeguards against such
dangers are provided for (Article 6 EU in conjunction with Article 1(3) of the
Framework Decision and §§ 6(2), 73 IRG),59  it will not be easy for the courts to
affirm the existence of such negative conditions in another member state and to
reject on that ground a request for surrender made through an EAW. It is also
urgent that a review of the list of offences in Article 2(2) of the Framework Deci-
sion be made in order to sort the wheat from the chaff. Furthermore, it remains
hard to understand why the guarantee of double criminality has been foregone.60
Essentially, this abandonment amounts to a mutual vote of mistrust. It is implic-
itly assumed that one of the member states has not shown the necessary zeal in
combating certain phenomena of social interaction and therefore has to be ‘disci-
plined’. Primacy is accorded to the interest in prosecution and punishment while
the deliberate option of one of the member states for tolerance is viewed as less
weighty. Specifically in a community of values, however, one may safely assume
that a decision against criminalization does not flow from ideological aberrations
or other forms of obscure theorem, but has solid foundations. In these respects,
the Framework Decision can safely be said to be failing.
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Having perused the judgment, the reader has definitely the impression that the
Karlsruhe judges again wanted to make their views on the limits of European
integration clear, but the case was not well suited for such a decision of principle.
The initial stage had dramatic features by the issuance of an interim order in
accordance with § 32 of the Act on the Federal Constitutional Court. Quite rightly
the Court issued that injunction since, in view of the complaints raised, it could
not be foreseen whether the applicant might suffer irreparable damage. However,
the further course of the proceedings yielded few elements of true tension. Conse-
quently, it certainly would have been more sensible to render a decision more
closely geared to the case at hand instead of declaring the entire EuHbG null in
one big bang. Among the positive aspects in this case is the lesson taught to the
legislative bodies that in the process of implementing Union and Community law
they must not act as servile machines of execution and that, on the contrary, they
have to shoulder an autonomous responsibility within certain limits, which are to
be carefully identified in each individual case.
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